FINAL CLEAR ADHERANCES

(BE SURE TO READ TO THE BOTTOM)

Sequential, oldest to newest:

It seems a major sort of addition needs to be made to cognitive-developmental ontogeny theory (Ethogram Theory)

Re: It seems a major sort of addition needs to be made to cognitive-developmental ontogeny theory (Ethogram Theory)

I have been out just to describe the developing very early processing and all the later hierarchical developments and processing, yielding the development and the progressing of the [grand/always-important] "outer container" (cognition). These are the levels of/stages of cognitive abilities being most of, and what's central to, guiding behavior: cognition, representation, abstract concepts and thinking, and actions. I NOW do believe something more is involved than I have yet ever indicated (something I avoided). For years and for decades:

I almost perhaps incredulously spoke nothing of emotions. Now I do; BUT, reservedly: I want to "add-in" and speak of just basic, early-on emotions that may be central to ALL cognitive development, per se: in particular it is those that are likely necessary to transfer a level of representation and thinking abilities from one domain (once established in an early domain) to another domain (this is sometimes known as transfer, sometimes as generalization -- neither which captures all that goes on with true hierarchical development with ontogeny).

I have long sought to make emotions (relatively simple response PATTERNS) something that can simply be added-in ("tacked on"), AFTER cognitive ontogenies are under way (which seemed esp. good for AL /AGI). But, the problem of humans (as well for AI / AGI) going from using a level of skills somewhere at first and THEN going from one domain to other domains for a new same sort of transformation THERE, i.e. to a essentially new similar level/stage of which he/she is capable THERE, has remained unclear. This matter is now, in much of mainstream psychology, explained hypothetically (or supposedly) based on obvious/common-sense contingencies of guidance (from others and language) _OR_ as using analogies or metaphor to find the similar structures (alignments) in the new domain. This does not often seem plausible and is not sufficient for the broad and quite precise applications for a new level of thinking. (It is too crude and contains irrelevancies.)

FINALLY NOW, I thought of my likely neglect in not providing sufficient impetus or motivation OR direction (or "self"-reward) for ontogenic shifts (at inception: BASIC perceptual shifts), then changes. Early on, and then later, given the representational context of past key developments:

Maybe SOME key emotions help direct the organism to take a closer look at things, actions, and events and with the simple general sorts of motivations GIVEN BY SOME truly basic emotions; if there is more "dwell time" and the organism will take a closer look, THEN he/she will find more, and develop a similar system of structure and understanding THERE (as well as in contexts where such a system was applied earlier).

For, after all, a number of notable emotions have been with us sentient beings since mammals and birds (evolutionarily speaking). Not using any, even for the development of the grand "outer" container no longer seems possible. They (some emotions) are there, and, if they give direction and impetus, why wouldn't the be used in cognitive stages key unfoldings (and making them more precise and reliable). These few particularly important emotions are THERE basically from birth. For me, now, NOT making use of a small set of basic emotions aiding cognitive development does not seem adaptationally likely OR even plausible (from the point of view of logic and soundness, as well as evolutionarily). The set of such basic emotions for cognition and cognitive ontogeny (throughout), i.e. for all major cognitive developments, can be likely understood as interest-excitement-anticipation and surprise and joy. (The combination, in the first 'hyphenated term' are in part(s) present in all modern theories of the basic emotions, while the last two are IN ALL such systems of understanding.) In short such emotions ARE THERE to provide major motivations to dwell on aspects of things, circumstances, and situations -- even situations, in later ontogeny, very much spanning instances (situations/circumstances) across times and space -- AND also facilitating the basic associative learnings -- so things "carry on".

Some present proposals which put forth that for "generalization" or "transfer" metaphors and/or analogies doing the bridging just do not work for me. This brings in irrelevant distraction elements and does not give you the needed precision or focus on new things or things seen-anew. Analogies and metaphors WITHIN a single stage may be helpful to the degree workable and appropriate in more minor learning regards.

Why an ethological-developmental theory of cognitive processes and of cognition?

Why an ethological-developmental theory of cognitive processes and of cognition? Here's my shortest answer:

(1) The Memories ARE Phenomenology: all of the most notable things we think and do are

PROMINENTLY with the Memories . BUT, it is more than that: If you just put together the definitions of all the various Memories (long term: episodic, declarative, procedural; working memory; visual-spacial memory; the episodic buffer; articulatory loop(s) etc.) it becomes obvious that "memory" (the Memories) are not just the very basis of our experience, but, in all the most important ways ARE EXPERIENCE (first-person phenomenology) ITSELF.

(2) The ethological cognitive-development theory is well-arguable and more justified (and worthwhile) than any other perspective/approach:

It is based on real things: aspects of the Memories ("memory") -- the clearest concepts and evidence in all of Psychology and, NOW, some emotions (also well-established), are also in the theory (see latest Update to the Project)

- (3) If what I have just outlined could be enough to suffice for explanations of cognition, cognitive processes and cognitive development, AND everything else is ill-defined, perhaps you can see how the assertions of this theory are justified AND, thus, it is possible that THIS outline for/of cognitive development suffices. If all this is true, then, why not "go for it". (see (5))
- (4) For science, understanding and to abolish trumped up hypotheticals (esp. the homunculi of all the "meta" and "executive processes" -- needed ONLY if you begin with a perspective based on false presumptions (I KNOW I do not need them); these concepts are clearly and literally concepts-of-convenience: not well-founded NOR researchable WITHOUT CLEAR PRESUMPTIONS. "Ditto" (the same argument) against "embodied cognition" and "enhancement" theories.)
- (5) Parsimony is the ultimate "null hypothesis" (act. hypotheses (plural), and ones this theorist would not like to see defeated __ AND YET __ the now near-clear hypotheses ARE testable, as is required for science). Like null hypotheses, you want to try to defeat them, BUT, in a case like this, one would be glad to see them essentially NOT defeated.
- (6) For Experimental Psychologists: This outlook allows experimental psychologists to better hypothesize and understand what the Subject BRINGS TO the lab -- and may make more naturalistic tasks, then valid as "stimuli". AND: The view/approach (at least eventually) allows experimental psychologists to better hypothesize BASIC processes ("perceptual shifts") and even look for them and find them in the lab setting (THAT time/space).
- (7) See (and this is vital):

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 314402953 Is psychology not a good science and if not how might it become one

[Please also read the latest Update to the Ethogram Theory Project. OR see:

https://www.researchgate.net/post/
It seems a major sort of addition needs to be made to cognitive-

developmental ontogeny theory Ethogram Theory

For further claims/justification see:

https://www.researchgate.net/project/Human-Ethology-and-Development-Ethogram-Theory-A-Full-Fledged-Paradigm-for-PSYCHOLOGY

One might ask: "Does this theoretical and research perspective provide any important new credible hypotheses?" Yes, it does: A major "internal" sub-theory explains the nature of abstract concepts (how their bases will be found distinct and how they come to be) (true abstract conceptual processing and not shallow, untrue "look-alikes", e.g earlier child "mimicry"). This possible knowledge and understanding comes with reading all the writings all the way through and then also the addenda (look for the phrase "lacking imagination for imagination"). AND:

Beside the fact that it is a strictly most-empirical approach, as empirical as any science, it respects necessary truths: most importantly, seeing behavior PER SE ("just behavior", actually, behavior PATTERNINGs) as organismic / biological (and there is the "structure", most vaguely alluded to in much research on cognition). And, the theory completes Piaget (his theory), with associated near-clear, near-specific hypotheses on how to detect (in direct observation of overt phenomenon (behavior PATTERNS, specifically BASIC perceptual shifts)) stage advancements. (Admittedly, for complete clear hypotheses, some discovery must be done.)

Also it redirects Western-oriented thinkers on how to DEFINE NOTHING (oneself, as a researcher), but seeing and realizing that the Subject (the organism) DEFINES ALL -- ALL: all concepts, in a most Subject-centered as well as truly empirical way as can be (all founded in (or its inception in) direct observations of overt behavior PATTERNS) -- as is the case in all legitimate science.

Finally, I do not know anything wrong with the perspective: it can incorporate any good findings (and would often improve perspective, e.g. again, wherever you see vague references in research on cognition to [clearly unknown] "structures").

I have offered as much as I can for the defeat of the view AND for one who accepts it, understands it and likes it, and then who edits the writings, and wants to be (with that) a co-author, ALL THAT. The good news is: no defeat in 6 years; the bad news ...

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Also see:

https://www.researchgate.net/post/lf the limits of Memory are presumed to be those limits s

hown with the limitations of the lab do you see the problem
I do challenge others to succinctly outline the main theory THEY use. Try 7 points and one brief paper (or anything else you can keep in mind and YET that is, IN THE MAIN, what you actually use AND it is/seems totally founded in reality AND, ultimately in OBSERVABLE replicable reality and with some likely validity). This is (or would be) a damned good exercise look how long it took me to do it.
ALSO: "Does this theoretical and research perspective provide any important new credible hypotheses?" If so, specify.
By the way, in many years the BEST IN THE FIELD (e.g. of Experimental Psychology, e.g. Davood Gozli) could not dispute my perspective and approach, but could only (literally) say "I disagree".
For descriptive details of the Theory (Ethogram Theory) itself see:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Isnt it obvious that Cognitive Science in Psychology refers t
o structure not understood, in particular, the Answers
TO ADD: first, a sort of PARTIAL abstract on the Question beginning this thread and, particularly on my

TO ADD: first, a sort of PARTIAL abstract on the Question beginning this thread and, particularly on my writings, in general (<-- about the relevance of all THAT). And, then after that, a listing of main "entry points" to my writings:

I have a cogent and extremely helpful theory, where I outline and indicate the nature of and the way to the discovery of the "maturation" involved in (or that IS) Equilibration Type 2 (that is the equilibration (homeostatic balance) between the stages (and thus putting the organism in the position to move on the the higher hierarchical stage)). This is the type of equilibration which, even to the end, Piaget could only say was "due to maturation". I believe I have found the way to discover the main inception or beginnings and proximate causes of these key parts of cognitive stage shifts. I complete this important part of Piaget's theory with strict empiricism: All concepts, constructs, models, etc. are clearly grounded/founded/ or begin with concrete observables -- the evidence is directly observable OVERT behavior patterns/patterning (and, of course, the relevant aspects of

situations or circumstances). BY the end of my 900 pages of my writings, and taking my perspective and approach, one can hypothesize THE proximate causes of stage shifts, the basic innately guided PERCEPTUAL SHIFTS which essentially are the beginning of shifts to more abstract conceptualization and abstract thinking -- and key to all else major in cognition which relates to this. I posit, but then outline STRICTLY EMPIRICALLY how to discover these basic "perceptual shifts" which are "allowed-for" by long-term memory abilities spanning times and spanning spaces MUCH MORE than has heretofore been imagined (in a real and significant sense: we now lack imagination FOR/OF imagination); and, it is just these that are the inceptions or beginnings of abstract thought.

This perspective and what my approach also yields is THE END OF ALL MAJOR NATURE/NURTURE CONFLICTS (as it has been hoped for for many decades). AND: It shows when/how "top-down" and "bottom-up" ARE THE SAME THINGS at important junctures.

Since essentially all my writings are needed to comprehend my testable (verifiable/falsifiable) hypotheses in-contexts and, for this, one must really read all my articles, essays, and books -- ALL AVAILABLE THROUGH RESEARCHGATE (researchgate.com)

For more detail, : READ:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286920820 A Human Ethogram Its Scientific Acceptability and Importance now NEW because new technology allows investigation of the hypotheses an early MUST READ and

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329428629 Essentially all Recent Essays on Ethogram Theory (basically a BOOK) and https://www.researchgate.net/project/Human-Ethology-and-Development-Ethogram-Theory (see the Project Log of this Project to see many important Updates.) ALSO, not among the 200 pages of major papers and 512 pages of essays in my "BOOK", above (which you already have been directed to), the following link gets you to 100 more pages of worthwhile essays composed after the 512 pages:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331907621_paradigmShiftFinalpdf (you CAN find the pdf at this last link, though it may take a little careful looking). And, similarly, see the other 2 addenda

ALSO, SEE THE RECENT RG POSTS:

https://www.researchgate.net/post/

Isnt it obvious that Cognitive Science in Psychology refers to structure not understood AND https://www.researchgate.net/post/It seems a major sort of addition needs to be made to cognitive-developmental ontogeny theory Ethogram Theory and https://www.researchgate.net/post/Can you realize top-down and bottom-

up ARE THE SAME THINGS at important junctures IN ONTOGENY child development

If the limits of Memory are presumed to be those limits shown with the limitations of the lab, do you see the problem?

If the limits of Memory are presumed to be those [limits] shown with the limitations of the lab (time/space), do you see the problem? What about long-term memory bridging times and individual circumstances/settings? [(and providing some such great context to the Episodic Buffer and (in important part) for working memory)]<-- AND THAT is highly likely explanatory for the abilities to have abstract concepts and do abstract processing. I believe I can "rest my case".

[One can base a lot on the great research on the Memories which is done (and I do), BUT NOT EVERYTHING: not all the bases of all Memory phenomenology can be seen PER SE as-founded OR found with findings THERE, with the current perspectives/view and now-used methods; BUT, worry not: I also provide an Answer here, to this sub-problem: not so much indirect evidence as the nature of the behavior patterns (BASIC perceptual shifts, likely present at/during each of the foundations -- inceptions in each new relevant situation -- of such a greater perspective that the the organism is developing), hypothesized to be DETECTABLE with eye tracking ** -- you're maybe only 900-pages away for understanding what I mean.]

** FOOTNOTE: not so far-fetched if you look at behavior PATTERNS per se ("just behavior") as biological onto itself (specifically: the patternings and patternings of patternings), which IT MUST BE.

Dear

You say, "at the level of both society and the Psyche - this is no more than a metaphor". In a way I can see this, because biological things do not have structures in any rigid sense (nor are there "mechanisms"). BUT: "Structure" has to do with set relations [(at points of key times)] _OR_ relatively constant relations between "things" -- "things" 'being whatever is addressed. This need not be static and the relations can have to do with principles (or laws) and, in THAT way, need not be be set (same-specific at all); it could be the relations between what are called, or regularly referred to, as "dynamic processes" (which is the way I see the matter). (Plus, this interpretation is a matter of both norms and often [also] fact (fact, at least in cases of well-defined relations that have reliable, observable foundations or inceptions and with some sort of external validity -- making them predictive). This has with little to do with philosophy -- esp. since it seems nothing per se has to do with philosophy.)

On the matter of "nonidentity of the subjective and the objective worlds": this assured seems NOT to be the case IN THE CASE of classical ethology (which most everyone has basically forgotten because of their rigid deterministic (forceful and autocratic) professors -- see

Preprint Where is the Trouble in Pseudo-empirical Research?

for an example of THE HUGE RESULT). If you want to see real fallacy,, see ontology, as "opposed" to ontogeny -- check me out on that Question (with my Answer).

Dear

I am as humanly far from the rigid sort you want to talk about as can be. I am a pure, well-founded, real empiricist (and no one has, or can, show otherwise -- just look into it). I am NOT a reductionist in any real sense of that word. I only assert that ultimately all concepts have to be "reduced" to what you see/sense (and this is only rationality and empiricism -- that really cannot be assailed). (Any serious science person goes well beyond the minimum standards of Popper -- and Kuhn for that matter.) P.S. I have nearly no use at all for neuroscience. (I must ask, dear Frederik, if your motivation is to negate or neutralize anything important that might be said -- so, in my view, this is the "wonderment" of much academia and (especially) philosophy.)

[Please note I often I add to Answers (like my Answer above) for even up to an hour, so please reread them. Thanks.] P.S. to all: my opponents are often those just restating what they "learned" in school, from professors who [indeed just] "profess"; ditto for Recommendations given to my opponents by others. You will find I quote (or mention) NO ONE, because I (as much as possible) evaluate ALL for myself -- and, it most certainly is not because I am not well-read. (With me, all philosophers are "barking up the wrong tree" (as the metaphor goes). Most modern philosophers claim to BE analytic philosophers, yet no one knows what "analytic philosophy" means -- and very few nowadays try to really (that is, in real contexts) do it.)

Dear

You say "It's not possible to be an empiricist - in the ordinary sense - and not be a 'reductionist', in the sense of a confounding a truth claim with a description of a state of affairs. " <- So, the philosopher, who addresses nothing, says. I respond: Read my writings and see no such confounding: Let me try to describe the nature of what is presented in those writings: I say there will be truths OF SOME CLEAR BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS in (or with respect to) a definable state of the organism's (the Subject's) affairs (often too crudely put as: aspects of "the environment"). Early in life, in the application of behavior patterns, and in all cases: both the circumstances and behavior patterns themselves are clearly and highly inter-related and really and truly defined (for us) by the organism -- AND the behavior pattern responses ("responses" implying "environmental aspects" responded to) are eventually the basis, NOT of ideas/concepts conjured by the researcher, but of the real clear overt [further] PATTERNED responding (behavior PATTERNS) at early clear key times in behavioral ontogeny. These are truths of THESE behavior patterns (RESPONSES), at key times in their

"environments", AND/BUT THEN (later) becoming, in a similar but "NEW" _present_ setting/situation/circumstance, a big part of the that present's natural contexts. I.E., these relevant earlier behavior PATTERNS, at any given later point in ontogeny are still in existence, also providing some of the major contextualization, with aspects you have already seen BEFORE, NOW perceptually related and/or conceptually related -- and NOW in the new "present", as represented (see below). SO: Presently we have the results of old established behavior PATTERNS with OTHER behavior PATTERNS emerging, so you have the new and the old, each and all, in response to key environmental/situational/circumstantial aspects.

Reiterating, adding more description: So, at key points, with this situation, now some key relevant elements of the sets of behavioral patterns that are older (and in some ways more easily dispatched with) set up the emergence of newer "higher" (more inclusive) hierarchical response patterns (using the older response patterns, BUT ALWAYS (if there are significant developments (ontogeny)), adding some key PATTERNING (and there being, then, some patternings of patterning) for us moving forward with changes in these later much-related settings. (As you can imagine, in such situations, earlier behavior response patterns apply to these settings by way of very often being represented (representation as images; both rather formal AND informal concepts; and recalled episodes (each and all as properly inferred from their earlier related settings and the way they WERE, AS existing similarly now, and them still being much the way they were when overt)). So, now, in this present, (the present, we are now discussing), they are not so much overt, but now a matter of memory that sets up a key new response pattern and patterning (new behavioral pattern aspects, being in some clear way more fully in response to the situation/circumstance) BY virtue of THE OLD patterns providing some major contextualization. It is THEN also we have, at key points, the NEW emergent patterns/patterning responding, to new or additional specific elements of the setting/environment/circumstances. (NOTE: There is NO true hierarchical developments without something new or significantly seen-anew.) With this later, key, PRESENT, the meaning of the presentsetting/aspects-of-the-"environment" ARE SEEN with/by (in good part) and from THE CONTEXT KNOWN OF THE OTHER OLDER PATTERNS. Both these old behavior patterns AND their relevant aspects of the environment are all part of the behavioral phenomenology now (at this later present), BUT this to be defined further in a way by essentially new environmental aspects, which are, in part and in some form, the old ones, and those also of the old behavior patterns now (with these patterned portions in less overt form) BUT with some addition(s) which shift behavior patterns and patterning overall. AGAIN: The old ones were at some time clearly overt. But, now, it is more: the truth (as much as there is "truth" at all) EXPANDS with a set of old relevant sets of response patterns, to environment aspects, sub-serving a new emerging behavior PATTERN when development goes beyond them, [having] the old PATTERNS special "in the story" by setting the context within which the new behavior patterns emerge (much of the contextualization from the old, from the Memories)], shifting the old with the emerging of the new patterns.

In short the DESCRIPTION OF SUCH A STATE OF AFFAIRS UNDERSTANDS PROPERLY THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE OLDER PATTERNS OF RESPONSES AND their ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS -- that

being NOW part of the current environmental aspects. This sort of study is obviously cumulative, but this approach is also self-correcting (NO POSSIBLE CONFOUNDS WILL REMAIN UNCORRECTED).

Directly above, I have roughly described just ONE CYCLE of FIVE that occur during human ontogeny (human child cognitive development (0-18+ years old)). All 5 "cycles" (each being a notable level/stage) are similar, though It is commonly said they differ qualitatively. This is basically a neo-Piagetian theory translated (as it must be) to be ethology -- and, making use of the most-excellent research results on the Memories (with a bit of innate emotional "auto"-incentive thrown in). This theory, though, is MOST strictly empirical and includes the way to FIND (discover) an explanation for the inception of these stage shifts. These stage changes (changes at the beginning of each stage) are first seen beginning in subtle ways: BASIC perceptual shifts (with eye tracking very likely needed to detect the shifts at key times and in key circumstances (<- note the plural)). Each stage shows itself in each kind-of-similar important domain and, with the theory and approach, this is described much more clearly and all is founded 100% empirically -- all theory concepts are clearly grounded [ultimately, but clearly and truly,] in directly observable overt behavior PATTERNS. The stages are the bases for abstraction and abstract thinking.

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For Basic Science: What Psychology needs is "multi-dimensional" studies (many TYPES) and NOT multi-disciplinary

The Multi-disciplinary approach gets various disparate findings put together by intuition (almost never good)(this criticism most certainly INCLUDING neuroscience findings). Multi-dimensional studies would involve MANY TYPES of studies, including several OUTSIDE THE LAB _and_ including better (and more varied) use of eye tracking (Psychology's microscope)

There may be much more to the latter (multi-dimensional studies). Feel free to add to this Discussion, adding perspectives and approaches

Can you realize "top-down" and "bottom-up" ARE THE SAME THINGS at important junctures IN ONTOGENY (child development)?

Isn't it obvious that Cognitive Science (in Psychology) refers to 'structure' not understood?

Isn't it obvious that Cognitive Science (in Psychology) refers to 'structure' not understood (and often admittedly not understood)?

I see it over and over again, and in nearly all Cognitive Science work, as some answer much needed but never addressed. I address 'structure.'

Can you realize "top-down" and "bottom-up" ARE [or certainly can, if not MUST, be] THE SAME THINGS at important junctures IN ONTOGENY (child development)?

This Question is NOT addressing YOU (the "self"), your social relations and activities, NOR your language. This question is about the biological processes SHOWN IN BEHAVIOR PATTERNS _PER_ _SE_ of the organism (aka "just 'behavior' "), DURING ONTOGENY, and beginning in overt and observable ways. As words are tools, to express certain things, sometimes (and even and especially at some critical times) the words used will seem contradictory or an oxymoron ,(e.g. it is hard to truly well-imagine a case of perception beginning thought). This cannot be viewed as a real problem. SO: at important key 'shift' points in development, what we CONCEPTUALIZE as "top-down", may have their actual key inception in what, in the highly [overt] behavior-related processes, may fundamentally have to be seen as "BOTTOM-UP". Major (if not THE major) shifts in behavior PATTERNS during cognitive development (of emerging seemingly qualitatively different stages/levels) may certainly have their inceptions in BASIC perceptual shifts (actually seeing new things or some things in a significantly new framing perspective AS new (or, in other words, the latter: "as seen anew")). [(THIS is seen as possible, if not necessary, if only by the reasoning processes of EXCLUSION -- if you are an empiricist/scientist.)]

With this perspective: the UN-defined bases of cognitive stages (equilibrium type 2, the balance between the stages and the point allowing for the stage shifts) is both more simple AND more researchable (with eye tracking) than anything conceived in academia heretofore. In short, this perspective is much more strictly empircial AND TESTABLE. [Piaget clearly, yet ultimately, ONLY ever

said one thing about such stage shifts: that they were "due to maturation" -- Piaget realized this was the most serious deficiency in his theory to the end of his days (explaining why his LAST BOOK was on Equilibration). Piaget was big on "formal logic", which inherently, as applied, results in embracing limited content -- for THAT (as applied) is OF our normative conceptual system, not of independent, actual real biological systems).]

To get more perspective of my view and approach, _start_ at: https://www.researchgate.net/post/Why an ethologicaldevelopmental theory of cognitive processes and of cognition and READ all the Answers (followups) and "go from there".

Now, well-argued, that much/most of Psychology is literally ridiculous (citation within)

It is now, well-argued, that much/most of Psychology is literally ridiculous, see:

Preprint Where is the Trouble in Pseudo-empirical Research? (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348647560 Where is the Trouble in Pseudo-empirical Research)

Those involved should surely respond appropriately and fully determine how (/why) that is.

Certainly, most all would tell me "it is not worth it, stop" (perhaps, particularly not "worth it" on Researchgate (and, often, so it seems)). I most assured would like to stop and WILL when I am finished [(apparently)] -- it's like a curse. PLUS, I have been told many times to give short Answers, but OFTEN that is only possible when we tell each other what we ALREADY "KNOW" which, in most cases, or certainly too often, is NOT WHAT WE HAVE EVALUATED FOR OURSELVES, BUT we have ESSENTIALLY __MEMORIZED__ ("learned") from Professors. (And, we like to be told and to repeat what we already "know".)

The game (quite literally a game -- or at least that is an extremely apt metaphor) may soon be over. Persons in Psychology may actually be better off if they "listen" to me or find [(not pretend to find)] another way. Please, IN ANY CASE, read the excellent Article, cited (I see that as unassailable with any sound logic -- EXCEPT: "we have to do it that way", and, to assert that superficially aping what could be the science of Psychology is "enough [somehow sufficient]" ("it will come together") and/or it is "all we can do" -- WHAT?, ARE YOU TRAPPED IN THE "LAB"?)). Behavior PER SE ("just behavior") is biological and PATTERNED and, if you cannot find PATTERNS and use that word, you are most assuredly "off track" -- truly defying what MUST be TRUE. Stop denying biology and science itself.

(Logic or even what very much seems to be soundness, is NOT ENOUGH -- LOOK to/for foundations.)

(If I ever need to provide an excuse for why I don't have a doctorate: it is because it was demanded that, with my topic, I follow suit with SELF-EFFICACY THEORY. (Again, see the Article -- it's bunk).)

Why People "in psychology" support "Embodied" and "Enhancement" "theories": THEY SIMPLY CANNOT BELIEVE [in] ANYTHING EXCEPT "LEARNING"

Truly preposterous (in fact, Trumpian): Why People "in psychology" support "Embodied" and "Enhancement" "theories": THEY SIMPLY CANNOT BELIEVE OTHERWISE _and_ often largely FORBID __believing__ ANYTHING EXCEPT ** "LEARNING" ** as the major "explanation" for much of everything. ("Learning", here, being basically an often ubiquitous, OFTEN ill-defined "concept" -- a "get out of jail free" type of thing) (such, as such, is not only seen as "OK" but a required BELIEF -- and, so often, JUST a belief (<- and no more to the foundation; under-specified and unresearchable (untestable) -- as embodied and enhancement "theories" themselves have been shown to be).)

Unfortunately, the only "jail" they are getting out of is: reasonable (and real) SCIENCE (yes, the problem is, indeed, of a Trumpian nature; and it often is raw ultra-simple vague believing (aka "just believing")). Truth is: Behavior must be, and is, IN PATTERNS. Correspondingly, behavior per se ("just behavior") _itself_ IS BIOLOGICAL (and that ITSELF is the full field of study) -- and psychologist are not even THERE yet (pause and think about THAT). (Also ask: How often, if ever, do I see the word "PATTERNS"?)

To slightly elaborate, on what all THAT (described above) truly is: Today's psychology "theories", identified above, are simply an extrapolation of Piaget's sensori-motor Period (0-2 y.o) to EVERYTHING cognitive (and, because of this this, they need not "believe" in stages/levels at all -- and, that is why THAT so very rarely comes up ("ditto" for any explanations for 'structure' to/"in" responding)). It is NOT because development (ontogeny) is a "separate" sub-"discipline", as they might try to claim; in fact, in a sense, with the unit of analysis being the individual human, there are no directly relevant separate disciplines or even sub-disciplines. And, so ill-grounded and ill-founded: psychologists get away with: if you CONJURE UP a pseudo-pattern (or, often, it is "identified" and referred to simply as "a behavior") and THEY name it, [because of Western philosophy], then it is happily assumed to be a THING (unto itself) (i.e. existing in reality) SEE:

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for some congruent material. (Words are NOT things.)

The 110+ year-old situation is disgraceful, and NOTHING they are doing will fix it or ever fix it. (Things will NOT just "come together" -- it is largely total stagnation (and, as Meehl said, just with changing FADS).)

In perhaps a more unclear way, a similar argument can be made against all the "hypothesized", but not clearly defined (by the Subject) -- so not testable -- "meta-cognitive [NOT] 'things' ", AND all the uselessly called [and simply supposed] "things" "termed" "executive processes". At best they are bad description. Maybe a better (or easier or more direct) perspective is: THEY ARE HOMUNCULI (disallowed in science) (arguments in favor of these basically mythical "things" are in essence: "because I said so" -- and "go" from there (they are OF J. H. Flavell)).

But even the argument in the Discussion Question, above, I would guess is applicable.

It is not hard to be with a mind-of-science if you have that.

How are the "perceptual shifts" in Ethogram Theory experienced phenomenologically by the Subject?

How are the "perceptual shifts" in Ethogram Theory experienced/felt phenomenologically by the Subject (the organism)? I have pondered this for a long time and my Answer (i.e. what I think) may seem anti-climatic:

The shifts as experienced may be ["self"-]perceived/felt as almost nothing (much like much perception) OR it (in a circumstance) may be an "it-is-one-of-those"-type of experiences __OR__ some may be ah-ha moments (which of the three literally depending on the circumstances of the circumstances ** (BUT, no one dare say "meta-circumstances" -- for they are NOT that)). [J. H. Flavell might even say this (my perspective) is a "meta-theory" (a "term", like the other "metas", HE has recently simply [again, just] "coined" (and recently used); BUT, my view is NOT THAT, because such-as-that, like all "metas" (and "executive processes"), basically DO NOT EXIST or, if they occasionally do seem so, or occasionally are so (e.g. for communication), THAT is not central -- no more central than "breaking down" the process of tying your shoes, and saying that "out loud"). The "meta" concepts were literally for LIMITED-research purposes and, for THAT, just "terms" of 'convenience' -- but now are VERY inconvenient, if one wants to recognize ontogeny and move forward.]

These possibilities are basically "it", as far as I can reason or imagine. But, RECALL, these occur with regard to environmental aspects ACROSS SITUATIONS/CIRCUMSTANCES (times/spaces), so they are

NOT like (or as) the "generalization" usually conceptualized -- and THAT is significant.

** FOOTNOTE: Recall that these shifts would/do have overt directly observable (at least with eye tracking) correspondents (accompaniments) in each relevant circumstance; <-- this is as it must be, for empiricism and for actual reality.

Question to you and THEM, the New Journal, "Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science" -- do you not know, and have you not seen, this done before?

There appears to be a core problem for the entire journal (its mission) (and AS shown by several authors of Articles, there, "in a row"): The intentions seem wonderful (again!). But, as I have indicated and justified: multi-disciplinary or inter-disciplinary "work" ARE __NOT__ the answer. WHY? Simple: We do NOT need to put more together "in our heads" (in ANY way or sense) -- THAT, basically is THE PROBLEM. With this Problem, will not come a solution. BUT, I have tried to provide a solution, bit-by-bit (at least), most days over many years now. Read me for a STARK alternative -- and, an alternative in more than one sense. Seek, there, and ye shall find A SOLUTION. (It is Definitely NOT what "you think".)

I am unfortunately, likely, to be the only one to offer this OR a solution (and it is not because "I am smart" -- I am not so much; you can determine the answer to THAT, along with all else). (I am "going", so do not fail yourselves.)

Psychology THEORY: I think I've been TOLD with: "The Logic of Consistent Theories is First Order Logic" (César Rodrigues) & just a bit MORE, that ...

I think I've been told WITH "The Logic of Consistent Theories is First Order Logic" (César Rodrigues) and, with just a bit MORE from him, THAT ... -> FOR DECENT THEORY: One should have logic all on the same level (the simple basic one) ___AND___ everything (ALL) THERE answerable (about presence/absence _OR_ in-effect OR NOT) as a clear YES or a clear NO and then you can have a theory that is both comprehensive and consistent (those last two go together). I believe I have this correct AND I THINK THAT I HAVE ALL THAT AND JUST THAT w/r to THE cognitive ontogeny (cognitive child development) of the human. So, Psychology, TO SEE, start at https://www.researchgate.net/post/Why an ethological-

developmental theory of cognitive processes and of cognition

If you CARE, start and go, assess, and use; by the way:

NOTE: ALL THIS is good for artificial intelligence and, specifically, for AGI (general artificial intelligence) (China may be listening, are the rest of you?).